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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT L1~KE CITY, a municipal ) 
corpora bon, 
Plaintiff-Respo 11de11 t, 
, Case No. 
vs. )/ 11141 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Def end ant-. \ppcllr1 n t. 
I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF N A'l'URE OF CASE 
This is an action filed by Salt Lake City under 
I the declaratory judgment act against the State of Utah 
to determine the legal status of an 1890 and a 1926 
"agreement" by Salt Lake City to provide free water 
to the territory of Utah and State of Utah, respectively, 
for use upon the buildings and grounds of the State 
Capitol. 
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As in appellant's brief, the respondent, Salt Lake 
City, in this brief will be ref erred to as the City, the ter. 
ritory of Utah as the Territory and the State of Utah as 
the State. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
The statement of the disposition in the lower court 
as set forth in appellant's brief is correct, except that 
appellant uses the words "grant of water", rather than 
a "grant of free use of water", the latter phrase appear· 
ing to be factually correct. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff and respondent seeks an affirmance 
of the summary judgment and decree granted it in the 
court below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
'Vhile it is true that this case was submitted to 
the lower court on the basis of stipulated facts, which 
included three ( 3) exhibits, all of which are in th,e 
record on this appeal, there is one "fact" in appellants 
"summarization" of these facts with which respondent 
cannot agree. 
On page four ( 4), first paragraph at the top .01 
the page, the appellant in its brief takes argumentatJ\'e 
2 
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liberties with the stipulated facts in saying, "as a part 
of this same arrangement and in order to carry out 
certain of the conditions in the deed, the City also 
granted the State (Territory) the use of water for 
the grounds and buildings located thereon." 
The record actually shows that the 1888 grant of 
]and by the City to the Territory on which land was 
to be built the capitol building did in fact require the 
Territory to use said land as a capitol site and to park 
and beautify said grounds, nothing being said in the 
deed of grant with regards to the water to be required 
for such purpose. These facts further show that no men-
tion was made of the needed water until two years later 
when the Territorial Legislature enacted the legisla-
tion, (R 11), appropriating the sum of $10,000.00 to 
be used to improve the capitol grounds, provided the 
City furnish free water for said grounds. 
As to the remainder of appellant's Statement of 
Facts, they appear to be correct and accurate and devoid 
of any legal editorializing. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE RESPECTIVE AGREEMENTS MADE 
WITH REFERENCE TO FURNISHING 
FREE \V ATER WITHOUT TIME LIMITA-
TION ARE ULTRA VIRES AND HENCE 
YOID. 
3 
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POINT II. 
THE AGREEMENT OF 1890 TO FURNISH 
FREE 'VATER WAS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC 
POLICY, WHICH POLICY WAS DECLARED 
IN 'VRITING AND EMBODIED IN ARTICLE 
XI, SECTION 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITl:. 
TION, AND IS THEREFORE VOID. 
POINT III. 
THE AGREEMENT OF 1926 TO EXTEND 
THE USE OF FREE 'V ATER TO "ADDITIOX-
AL LANDS" WAS IN VIOLATION OF AR-
TICLE XI, SECTION 6, OF THE UTAH CON-
STITUTION AND THEREFORE VOID. 
POINT IV. 
THE AGREEMENT BY THE CITY TO 
PROVIDE THE TERRITORY FREE USE OF 
ITS 'VATER WAS NOT A GRANT OF A 
WATER RIGHT BUT MERELY AN ABOR· 
TIVE ATTEMPT TO ENTER INTO A COX· 
TRACT TO PROVIDE WATER FREE OF 
CHARGE 'VHICH AGREEMENT WAS VOID 
FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
POINT V. 
THE CITY HOLDS ITS 'VATER RIGHT~ 
AND REGULATES ITS WATER RATES L 
4 
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A POSITION OF TRUST FOR THE USE AND 
BENEFIT OF ITS RESIDENTS TO BE DIS-
'f RIB UTE D AT EQUAL RATES, AND, 
THEREFORE, SO ACTS IN A STRICT GOV-
ERNMENTAL CAPACITY, WHEREBY IT 
CANNOT LOSE SUCH WATER RIGHTS AND 
THE RIGHTS TO DISTRIBUTE ITS WATER 
AT EQUAL RATES BY ESTOPPEL, LACHES 
OR ADVERSE USE OF ITS WATER BY 
THIRD PARTIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE RESPECTIVE AGREEMENTS MA.DR 
WITH REFERENCE TO FURNISHING 
FREE \VATER WITHOUT TIME LIMITA-
TION ARE ULTRA VIRES AND HENCE 
VOID. 
"The established rule (of law) is that muni-
cipal corporations have no power to make con-
tracts which will embarrass or control them in 
the performance of their legislative powers and 
duties." McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 
1966 Revised Volume, Volume 10, Section 29.07, 
p. 245. 
This same treatise in said section 29.07 goes on to 
state: 
"So, power conferred upon a city to contract 
respecting a particular matter does not confer 
power, by implication, so to contract with refer-
ence thereto as to embarrass and interfere with 
5 
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~ts future control over the matter, as the public 
mterests may reqmre. Hence, all contracts which 
inter/ ere with the legislative or governmental 
functions of the municipality are absolutely 
void." · 
A most interesting case from this jurisdiction, 
involving this question, is that of Warm Springs Co. 
v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 58, 165 P. 788. In that case 
the city leased premises to plaintiff's assignor within 
city limits, which premises were comprised of a warm 
springs bath facility and a saloon for bar purposes, 
both premises leasing for $200.00 per month. Plaintiff 
and assignee operated the bathing facility but sublet 
the saloon for $100.00 per month, operating thus frorn 
1906 to 1911 when the city passed an ordinance pursuant 
to state statute excluding the saloon premises from the 
district in which intoxicating liquors might be sold. 
Thereafter the plaintiff paid the $200.00 monthly 
rentals under protest and in 1916 plaintiff presented 
its claim to the city for $5,700.00, which claim the city 
denied. The court denied the plaintiff's right to recover 
back the rentals paid under protest, stating as follows: 
"If the city had entered into a lease in which 
it had guaranteed the plaintiff the right to con· 
tinue the saloon business in the teeth of chapter 
106, the lease to that effect would have been void. 
T¥hat could not be accomplished directly, there· 
fore, cannot be accomplished indir_ectly . · : I~ 
this case the act bv the citv which 1s complame 
of was governme~tal act, ·and hence the,, city 1' 
not liable for the consequences of the act. (Em· 
phasis added.) 
6 
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By analogy, if a City Commission in the instant 
case had purported to lease in perpetuity a water right 
to the Territory (and later to the State), thus attempt-
ing to deprive future City Commissions of the power 
to regulate the sale of water to its inhabitants, surely 
such lease in perpetuity would, under the reasoning and 
the rule of the 'Varm Springs Co. case be held void. 
Such was the ruling of the court in the case of Belcher 
Sugar Refining Co. vs. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co., 
101 Mo. 192, 13 S.W. 822, wherein it was held that 
where a city has the right to lease a part of its wharf 
for the purpose of a warehouse and grain elevator, it 
must reserve the right to terminate such lease whenever 
the public interest demands such action. 
Along these same lines, and very much in point and 
on all fours with the facts in the instant dispute is the 
case of City Council of Augusta vs. Richmonil County, 
9134, 178 Ga. 400, 173 S.E. 140. In that case the plain-
tiff county brought action against defendant city to 
enjoin the city from cutting off water supplied by city 
to county courthouse for the past 40 years or more. 
The city and the county had jointly occupied the court-
house and grounds from 1820 to 1890 when, pursuant 
to an equitable proceeding in court, an agreement was 
entered into between the county and the then Mayor 
of the City which in part provided: 
"The city council shall furnish all water neces-
sary to run fountains, water closets, and for all 
other purposes to the county, free of rent." 
7 
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Thereafter, for a period of forty-three years the 
city did furnish free water to the county as provided 
in said agreement. In applying the law to the abore 
stated facts the Supreme Court of Georgia in reversing 
the lower court, stated: 
"\Ve cannot concur in the judgment rendered 
by the court 1Jelow. \Ve do not think that the 
municipality could make a binding contract to 
furnish water free of charge for an indefinite 
time in the future, for the purpose mentioned in 
the contract referred to. 1'he agreement rnade in 
reference to furnishing water without charge on 
the part of the cit/j was ultra vires, and could 
not be enforced as against subsequent council! 
of the municipality." (Emphasis added.) 
A case from another jurisdiction, the State of 
Illinois, which further explains the law relating to a 
municipal corporation's lack of power to contract away 
its water and water rights, (and this without the benefit 
of a constitutional prohibition such as we have in this 
state) is that of Eastern Illinois State Normal School 
vs. City of Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, lll N.E. 573. In 
that case the city owned and operated a waterworks 
plant and system and as an inducement to procure the 
location of the school at said city the City Council 
adopted a resolution which provided that if the school 
located within the city's limits the city would furnish 
water to the school for the consideration of five dollars 
for a period of fifty years. The court held that the cit)· 
had no power to make such a contract and said contract 
was void and could not be enforced. 
8 
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In the case of Shannon v. Huron, 9 S.D. 356, 69 
~.W. 598, plaintiff sought to enforce payment of certain 
warrants issued by the city in payment of debts due 
for printing certain bills, pamphlets, circulars, letter-
heads and envelopes, at the instance of persons who 
had been selected at a public meeting to compose a 
committee for the purpose of bringing forward the 
City of Huron as a candidate for the capitol of the 
State of South Dakota. The court held the warrants 
void, saying: 
"The constitution of this state, legally adopted 
and ratified, was in full force at the time plain-
tiffs entered into an agreement with the capitol 
committee to do the printing for which three of 
the warrants in the suit were afterwards issued 
directly to plaintiffs; and article 10 of section 
2 thereof provides that 'no tax or assessment shall 
be levied or collected, or debts contracted by 
municipal corporations, except in pursuance of 
law for public purposes specified by law.' The 
location of the state capitol for the benefit of 
private individuals was a matter wholly foreign 
to the purposes and objects of the corporation, 
the charter of which neither expressly nor by 
implication authorized any of its officers to bur-
den the municipality with debts incurred in fur-
therance of the scheme; and the city was entirely 
powerless to issue its warrants therefor. Plain-
tiffs, the capitol committee, and all other persons 
dealing with the officers of the municipality, had 
notice and were charged with a knowledge of the 
law, under the limitations and restrictions of 
which no liability could be created or debt in-
curred against the city of Huron for printing 
9 
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capitol campaign literature, and the warrants 
when issued, were void in toto." ' 
The application of law in the Shannon case to the 
matter before this court clearly points out the fact that 
when the city fathers purported to provide (for an 
indefinite period) free water to the Territory of Utah, 
such act was beyond the power and authority of the 
municipality and such an arrangement was void in toto 
as the court stated. in the Shannon case. 
POINT II. 
THE AGREEMENT OF 1890 TO FURNISH 
FREE "\VATER WAS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC 
POLICY, WHICH POLICY WAS DECLARED 
IN "\VRITING AND EMBODIED IN ARTICLE 
XI, SECTION 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION, AND IS THEREFORE VOID. 
In the year 1895, pursuant to the authority of 
the Enabling Act passed by the Congress of the United 
States, delegates were elected to serve in the Consti· 
tutional Convention of Utah. These delegates discussed 
at some length the article of the proposed Constitution 
which had reference to municipal corporations, and the 
part which concerned them most was Section 6 of 
Article XI, as adopted, and which reads as follows: 
"Sec. 6. [Municipalities forbidden to sell water· 
works or rights J No municipal corporation, shall 
directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispo~; 
of any waterworks, water rights, or sources 
10 
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water supply now, or hereafter to be owned or 
controlled by it; but all such waterworks, water 
rights and sources of water now owned or here-
after to be acquired by any municipal corpora-
tion, shall he preserved, maintained and operated 
by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at 
reasonable charges: Provided, That nothing 
herein contained shall be construed to prevent 
any such municipal corporation from exchanging 
water-rights, or sources of water supply, for other 
water-rights or sources of water supply of equal 
value, and to be deYoted in like manner to the 
public supply of its inhabitants." 
It is interesting to read these proceedings and the 
record of this discussion for it clearly portrays the think-
ing of those men and the foresight they exercised in 
recognizing the need for declaring in writing the public 
policy of this state with reference to the sacred trust 
in which cities hold their water for the benefit of their 
inhabitants. 
On page 672, first column, of Volume I, Proceed-
ings, Constitutional Convention 1890, Utah, one of the 
delegates, a Mr. S. A. Thurman, in discussing Section 
6 as it reads above, stated: 
" . . . I think the amendment (deleting the 
phrase 'water at reasonable charges)' ought to 
prevail, 'water at reasonable charges.' Now, I 
take the position that if we leaYe the balance of 
the section star~d, requirin,r; cities to hold ihis 
property (ownership and control of water rights 
and water supply) w; a trust for the benefit of 
the inhabitants to supply them with water, the 
courts will always construe the question of a 
11 
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reasonable charge, because it will be a trust fixed 
and formed by the constitution for the purpose of 
supplying the people with water, ... " (emphasis 
added) 
As hereinafter stated, on the basis of the historv 
and the law, it is respondent's contention that Artie!~ 
XI, Section 6 of the Utah Con'3titution was a written 
declaration of the commo~1 law existing in the Territory 
of Utah prior thereto and specifically when the 1890 
agreement to furnish free water was made. 
In Am. J ur. 2d, Vol. 16, page 270 and 271,Section 
87, under the heading Circumstances Attending Adop-
tion of Provisions; Existing Conditions and History, 
on page 271, is the following statement: 
"A constitutional provision must be presumed 
to have been framed and adopted in the light 
and understanding of prior and existing laws 
and with reference to them, and, like a statute, 
is properly to be expounded in the light of coruli· 
tions existing at the time of its adoption, the 
general spirit of the times, and the prevailing 
sentiments among the people." (emphasis added) 
The court's attention is also called to a statement 
in C.J.S., Constitutio1Ull Law, Volume 16, page 116, 
Section 36, under the heading, Construction With Ref· 
erence to Common Law, wherein it is stated: 
"In the absence of a clear intention to the con· 
trary, a constitution is generally to be constr~ed 
in the light of the common law, since there 15 a 
presumption that no change in the common Jaw 
was intended. 
12 
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"Since a constitution is not the beginning of 
law in the state, it assumes the existence of a 
well understood system of law which is to remain 
in force." 
The court is fully aware of the history of the arid 
west, and particularly of the history of the Territory 
and State of Utah; that the early pioneers and settlers 
of this arid region realized that water was the life blood 
of their civilization and that particularly for cities and 
towns to grow, it would be necessary to zealously guard 
and protect the water rights of such cities and towns 
with a sacred trust against any political or economic 
maneuvering by elected officials which could in the 
future jeopardize and irreparably injure the residents 
of any such city or town; that when the framers of 
our constitution met and drafted it they expressed in 
Article XI, Section 6, the common law as it had existed 
in this Territory up to that time; and, finally, that the 
constitution when adopted did, therefore, not change 
the law of the State of Utah which now expressly pro-
hibits, and in 1890 did impliedly prohibit, cities and 
towns from alienating or giving away in perpetuity 
any of their water or water rights and that said con-
stitutional provision was a written declaration of such 
basic common law as did previously exist in this State 
when a Territory. 
1 
POINT III. 
THE AGREEMENT OF 1926 TO EXTEND 
THE USE OF FREE WATER TO "ADDITION-
13 
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AL LANDS" 'VAS IN VIOLATION OF AR. 
TICLE XI, SECTION 6, OF THE UTAH CON. 
STITUTION AND THEREFORE VOID. 
The meaning of Article XI, Section 6 of the Uta!i 
Constitution (supra) appears to be absolutely clear 
and unequivocal. However, this Honorable court was 
asked to render an interpretation of this constitutional 
1 
provision in the case of Hyde Park Town v. Chambers, , 
99 Utah ll8, 104 P.2d 220, which case dealt with the 
power or right of a city or town to alienate any of its 
water rights in light of the above constitutional prol'i· 
sion. The town of Hyde Park purported to exchange 
a water right or a right in perpetuity to free use of 
the town's water for a right of way for its water main, 
which transaction this court held to be in violation of 
Article XI, § 6, supra, as an abortive attempt to alienate 
the water rights of a city or town. This court stated: 
"We are of the opinion that the contract is void as 
contended by the town," (the Town's contention was 
that this contract was void as in violation of Article 
XI, § 6, (supra). 
The application of the law as rendered in the Hyde 
Park Town case would clearly make void and unen· ' 
forceable the purported agreement entered into in 1926 
between the City and the State. 
There is no logical reason in the law why a state, 
as a party, should have any greater right to violate 
bd. · · and its own constitution with respect to su 1v1s10ns · 
municipalities of that state than would private indt· ' 
14 
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riduals or any other party. There should be no question, 
therefore, but that the State of Utah was bound, and 
still is bound, by its own constitutional limitations in its 
contractual relationships with others, including a city 
of that state. 
The State next advances the conclusion that the 
City's 1926 agreement to furnish free water to an 
additional 20 acres of land which the State added to 
the original capitol site was "No more than a clarifi-
cation of the 1890 grant." Instead of being a clarifica-
tion of the 1890 promi~e to "grant" free use of city 
water, this agreement actually purported to extend 
the terms of the former "grant" of free water to the 
additional land. 'Vhy was a clarification of the original 
promise necessary or required? Free water had been 
e delivered under the original promise for about 36 years 
!: without question. No problem of construction or inter-
15 pretation of the original promise had arisen that needecl 
as clarification. The fact is the State had acquired addi-
le tional lands to add to the capitol grounds and per-
1 
suaded the City to furnish free water to these grounds 
· the same as the City was furnishing free water to the ~~ 
1 
original capitol site. Such a "grant" of free city water 
could not relate back and be a part of or in any way 
20 
'· clarify the original "grant". It was a brand new promise 
to furnish additional water without charge to additional 
te, kind, but made, we submit, in violation of Section 6, 
ate Article XI of the State Constitution and was, for that 
1nd , reason, void. 
1d1· I 
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POINT IV. 
THE AGREEMENT BY THE CITY TO 
PROYIDE THE TERRITORY FREE USE OF 
ITS 'VATER WAS NOT A GRANT OF A 
WATER RIGHT BUT MERELY AN ABOR-
TIVE ATTEMPT TO ENTER INTO A CON- i 
TRACT TO PROVIDE WATER FREE OF I 
CHARGE WHICH AGREEMENT WAS VOID! 
FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION. 
1 
Historically, the arrangement for the City to fur· 
nish free water for the grounds and any building erected 
thereon was an after-thought and was not related to, 
nor a part of, the consideration for the State Capitol 
being located in Salt Lake City. 
The State first argues that the conveyance of the 
Capitol site to the Territory and the later granting 
of free water to the capitol grounds commission were 
one arrangement or transaction. We maintain that this 
is no more than a fortuitous assumption, wholly falla-
cious and contrary to the stipulated facts. w·e shall 
demonstrate this by the following detailed reference to 
the facts as stipulated. 
The deed to the Capitol site was dated May 1. 
1888. It provides: 
"To have and to hold the above granted prem· 
ises, with appurtenances, and every part thereo~ 
unto the said party of the second part · · · .fo1 the erection and maintenance of the capitof 
buildings of Utah Territory or future state 0 
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Utah and the proper appurtenances and sur-
roundings, including a reservoir to said capitol 
buildings and grounds." 
It provided further as a condition to the grant, "that 
a portion of said land not actually devoted to buildings 
as aforesaid be improved and cultivated as a public 
park." 
At the 1888 Session of the Territorial Legislatur1:, 
according to the certificate by C. A. Tingey, Secretary 
1 of State, (page 5, Exhibit "A"), it passed an Act, 
Chapter 28, creating a board of commissioners on capitol 
grounds, "to take possession and control of the grounds 
conveyed by the city of Salt Lake to the Territory of 
Utah ... to grade, fence, improve," the same. 
The Territorial Legislature approved an appro-
priation March 13, 1890, Chapter XXXIX, Item 52, 
which provided "for the improvement of capitol grounds 
to be drawn and expended under the supervision of the 
capitol commission, $10,000.00, provided that the above 
amount be expended on the condition that Salt Lake 
City furnish, free of charge, sufficient water for said 
grounds and for the building proposed to be erected 
thereon." (Paragraph 3, page 2, stipulation of facts.) 
The Board of Commissioners on Capitol Grounds, 
under date of April 29, 1890, in a letter to Salt Lake 
City, called attention to the lack of funds in the Terri-
torial treasury to pay its share of the cost of the reservoir, 
asking the city to pay its share. The letter further 
stated that the late Legislature appropriated $10,000.00 
17 
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for improvement of the grounds with the proviso that 
the city furnish water without charge for the grounds 
and any building erected thereon, "as this was speci-
fically understood with the city when arrangements were 
made to begin the work." (Meaning the work of im-
proving the grounds.) (Paragraph 4, page 4, Stipula-
tion of facts.) (Emphasis added.) 
The City on receipt of this letter under date of 
May 6, 1890, passed the resolution to furnish water 
without charge for use on the capitol grounds and build-
ings. This resolution reads: 
"WHEREAS, the late Legislature appropri-
ated th~ sum of $10,000 for improvement of the 
Capitol Grounds with the proviso that the city 
furnish water without charge for the grounds 
and any building erected thereon. 
"BE IT RESOLVED that the free use of 
water be granted to the Commission for the use 
of the Capitol Grounds and for the use of any 
buildings erected thereon in accordance with the 
specific understanding with the City when the 
arrangements were made to begiJn work on said 
grounds." (Emphasis added.) 
From the foregoing it is clear that the matter of 
furnishing free water was an afterthought, a unilateral 
condition imposed by the Legislature as a string to 
the appropriation of $10,000.00 to improve the Capitol 
Grounds and came solely as a result of the action of 
the Legislature in this respect and had nothing to do 
with the prior grant of the Capitol site. It also appears 
that this grant of free water was negotiated when the 
18 
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Capitol Grounds Commission began the work of im-
proving the grounds and not before. This condition was 
not mentioned in the deed conveying the land to the 
Territory or as one of the several conditions contained 
in the deed under which and subject to which the land 
was conveyed for Capitol Grounds purposes. It was 
not until two years later when the Legislature appro-
priated $10,000.00 to improve the land and the work 
of improvement began that the furnishing of water, 
free or otherwise, was raised. If there had been any 
agreement prior to the appropriation of $10,000.00 that 
the City would furnish free water there would be no 
need for this proviso in the appropriation; The un-
disputed fact is that it was not until the Capitol Com-
mission commenced work of improving the grounds 
after the Legislature had appropriated money therefor 
that the City agreed to furnish free water. The deed 
had already been executed and recorded. 
Under the terms of the deed the Territory was 
bound to improve the grounds not used for buildings 
for a public park at its own expense. The deed also 
provided for the construction of a reservoir to supply 
water to the Capitol Grounds, the City and Territory 
each to pay one-half of the cost. No mention was made 
of free water, ilthough the matter of water was con-
~idered in providing for a reservoir. It is curious indeed 
that this item of free water was not mentioned in the 
deed along with the reservoir and other conditions if 
' it was a part of the original transaction. It was not 
until the Board on Capitol Grounds was ready to im-
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prove the land and an appropriation of $10,000.00 for 
that purpose was made that the matter of free water 
first arose. When the Legislature appropriated thal I 
su1n for the improvement of the ground,s, it did only 1 
that which it was already obligated to do under tne 
express terms of the deed, namely, improve the grounds 
not used for buildings for a public park. If the Territory 
failed to use this money and improve the grounds it : 
would be in violation of the terms of the deed even if 
the City demanded payment for the water. The con-
clusion is inescapable that there was, and is, no con· : 
I 
sideration at all for the grant of free water by the City. : 
The obligation to improve the grounds as a public park ! 
already rested upon the State by the terms of the deed. 
In granting free water the City simply acceded to the 
demand of the Legislature (which the learned trial 
judged observed amounted to legislative "extortion") 
that it furnish free water when the $10,000.00 appro· 
priation was made to improve the Capitol Grounds, 
an obligation which already rested upon the Territorr 
under the terms of the City's deed. 
Although in its resolution the City Council of Salt 
Lake City used the word "granted'', this word must be 
understood in light of the full context of the resolution 
of l\Iay 6, 1890. The court's attention is called to the 
specific language of said resolution wherein the council 
said "That the free use of water be granted to the Coro· 
mission for the use of the Capitol grounds and for the 
use of any building erected thereon ... " It is clear fr~m 
this language that it was never the intent of the City 
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fathers to "grant" to the Territory any water right of 
any description, kind or nature. A water right, as the 
court is well aware, is in legal formalities considered 
realty. A grant of a water right, therefore, must needs 
carry with it in accordance with the laws of the State 
of Utah all of the necessary requisites of a conveyance 
of real property. Certainly, the appellant does not claim 
that the resolution of May 6, 1890, complies with such 
requirements and could in anywise purport to be an 
actual grant of a water right. There is nothing in said 
resolution which describes the nature of the water, the 
u.Ye of which is "granted", nor is there any reference 
1 to the point of diversion or to the quantity of any such 
water. The resolution, on its face, clearly shows that 
the intent of the City Council was only to allow the 
Territory to take water belonging to the City and use 
it without being charged therefor. Such use was per-
missive and no rights under the law can be or ever 
could be obtained in perpetuity to such water on the 
theory that the Territory obtained a "grant" of water 
from the City. The best that could be said for the 
"right" of the Territory is that it obtained a right to 
a free water supply, which it did not and could not do, 
rather than a water right. In the case of Boyce v. Killip, 
184 Ore. 424, 198 P.2d 613, the Supreme Court of 
the State of Oregon held that the terms "water supply" 
and "water right" generally do not have the same con-
notation, the latter term meaning generally the right 
to divert water by artificial means from a natural 
stream or spring, and that where the parties had claimed 
21 
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a right to divert water, not from a stream or spring, but 
from a pipe which was part of a water system origin11t. 
ing at a stream, there was a right to a "water supplH 
rather than a "water right". 
The position of the State in claiming a "grantef i 
I 
water right appears unfounded in law and in fact. Salt 
Lake City in effect "grants" to each and every resident 
of the city a right to take water from its water system. 
but this implied right or grant certainly does not gin 
the City resident any "granted" right to obtain !ht 
water flowing in the city's mains without payment 
therefor. There is no reason in the law or under the 
facts of this case why the State should stand in any 
more favored position from a financial standpoint than 
any other person within the confines of Salt Lake City. 
Futhermore, the source of supply of water whicl1 
the City has delivered into the distribution system of 
the State for the last 77 years has been and alwap 
will be water belonging to Salt Lake City. The water 
does not come under the control of the State for it1 
use and benefit until it leaves the water mains of the 
City, nor has the State acquired any right, whatsoev.er. I 
in this water until it leaves the water mains of the C1~· 
and flows into the distribution system of the State. At I 
I 
that point the water belongs to the State of Utah, not : 
by reason of any water right thereto, but because the I 
City has physically connected its water mains witli I 
those of the State, allowing this water to flow into the I 
State's distribution system and the only question ii 
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whether or not the State by reason of the agreements 
of 1890 and 1926 should be exempt from paying the 
City for said water used by it the same as any other 
private user. \Vhen understood in this light, this case 
is clearly one to determine whether or not the City 
fathers under the basic common law and later the con-
stitutional prohibition had any power whatsoever to 
enter into such an agreement to deliver to the Territory 
and later the State of Utah free water which, under 
a sacred trust, belonged to, and was to be held for, 
the use and benefit of the residents of Salt Lake City. 
The court's attention is called once again to the dis-
cussion of the delegates to the Utah Constitution Con-
' vention as regards Article XI, Section 6 (supra). Most 
of their fears were directed to the question of cities 
and towns in the State using their water systems in an 
equitable manner so that all the users thereof would be 
charged fair, equitable, and equal rates for the water 
used. In light of this discussion it would appear a clear 
violation of the intent of the framers of our consti-
tution to allow the State of Utah as one of the users 
of that water to violate the spirit of this constitution. 
Particularly is this true where the facts clearly indicate 
that the 1890 arrangement "granted" to the Territory 
only the free use of the City's water rather than a clear 
grant of a water right out of a stream or other source 
of that water. 
In view of the foregoing law and facts it is clear 
that the State of Utah has acquired no right whatsoever 
to the use of the City water by a grant of a water right. 
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One of the cases cited by the appellant is the ca1,, 
of City of Big Spring, 389 S.W.2d 533, 404 S.W.i,: 
810, wherein a court upheld the validity of a contrati 
in which the City agreed to deliver free water to 1i 
hospital so long as it remained and was operated w 
the said city. This case is of little value to prove tn1 
defendant's point for the reason that Texas does no:, 
appear to recognize the common law of the State m 
Utah, nor lvis it ever by any constitutional provisio'. 
declared any such conduct of the City Council to 01! 
invalid. Furthermore, the City in that case receiveJI 
the consideration that the hospital would be locatedmi 
said city to the benefit of the city in exchange for tl1t\ 
water. Under the facts of the instant case the ci~' 
received absolutely no benefit from the Territory for 
the free water which the city agreed to deliver as ha1 
been discussed under this Point IV of this brief. 
POINT V. 
THE CITY HOLDS ITS \VATER RIGHT~ 
AND REGULATES ITS WATER RATES IX 
A POSITION OF TRUST FOR THE USE AXD 
BENEFIT OF ITS RESIDENTS TO BE DIS· 
TR I BUTE D AT EQUAL RATES, A~H 
THEREFORE, SO ACTS IN A STRICT GOY. 
ERNMENTAL CAPACITY, \VHEREBY IT 
CANNOT LOSE SUCH\VATERRIGHTSAXD 
THE RIGHTS TO DISTRIBUTE ITS WATEr I 
AT EQUAL RATES BY ESTOPPEL, LACHES I 
24 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OR ADVERSE USE OF ITS WATER BY 
THIRD PARTIES. 
In the case of City Council of Augusta vs. Rich-
moM Cownty, (supra) the court cites from the case of 
Horkan vs. City of Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561, 71 S.E. 
785, wherein the court in the latter case says: 
"A council of a municipality cannot make a 
binding contract by which it undertakes to obli-
gate the municipality to furnish 'free of charge', 
for an indefinite time in the future, sufficient 
water for the closets in a given building situated 
within the corporate limits, in consideration of 
the owner of the building allowing the munici-
pality to lay its sewers through the land. Such a 
contract, being ulta vires and void, could not be 
ratified by the continued use, under the contract 
of the sewer through the land by the municipal-
ity; nor would the benefit thereby received estop 
it from subsequently setting up the invalidity 
of the contract.' In the opinion Chief Justice 
Fish said: 'We have found no case, however, that 
would tend to support a contract made by a city 
council in behalf of the municipality to furnish 
water indefinitely to one of its citizens, in con-
sideration of his permitting it to lay a sewer 
through his land. Succeeding councils would 
necessarily have the power, we think, to change 
the water rates from time to time as circum-
stances might require or justify, in order to obtain 
sufficient revenue to maintain its waterworks 
system on the one hand, and, on the other, in 
order to serve all its patrons at reasonable rates 
and on equal terms. To allow one council to 
legally bind the city by a contract of the kind 
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here in question might so tie the hands of it· 
successors as to res wt in great injury to the mu 
nicipality and to the public. * * * Power in . 
municipality of maldng and changing, by ord
1 
I 
nance, water rates from time to time, whenett,i 
necessary to protect the city in its revenues ai1,1. 
to enable it to furnish to all on equal terrns mw 
at reasonable prices, is a legislative or govm 
mental power, and the ref ore cannot be legal/1i 
bargained or bartered away by one council, .i• 
as to .fnrever dqJri'l'e succeeding councils of 1111 
right to exercise it." (Emphasis added). 
Of further interest is the disposition which tha! 
court made with regards to the argument that the Ci~ 
having received the consideration, (the locating of tht 
school within the city limits) was estopped to dispute 
the validity of the contract even though it had no pmrn 
to enter into the said contract in the first instance. Tl1t 
court answered this claim by stating: 
"Every one is presumed to know the extent uf 
the powers of a municipal corporation, and ii 
cannot be estoppecl to aver its incapacity, whicl1 
would amount to conferring power to do un· 
authorized acts simply because it has done them 
and received the consideration stipulated there· 
for." (Emphasis added.) 
It may be argued that Salt Lake City operate' j 
its water system in a proprietary capacity and that : ' 
therefore, none of the cases heretofore cited would be 
applicable law to the facts of this case. Such a position 
is "·ithout any legal basis whatsoever. Our Supreni
1
e : 
Court has already ruled in the case of Brummitt, et 111 
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v. Ogden Waterworks Co., 33 Ut. 289, 93 P. 828, as 
follows: 
"That the fixing and regulating of water rates 
is a governmental function and cannot be sur-
rendered nor suspended by the city council is 
agreed to by all concerned in this action." (Em-
phasis added.) 
1lunicipalities in this State, therefore, cannot enter into 
ralid and binding contracts with regard to the rates 
for services rendered to the public. The right to regulate 
and fix rates cannot be surrendered. The court in the 
Brummitt case goes on to say: 
"In short, while a municipality cannot impair 
the obligation of its contract under the guise of 
exercising its police power, yet it canp.ot sur-
render or barter away its police powers under 
the guise of making a contract ... We are con-
strained to hold, therefore, that the agreement 
fixing the rates for the entire period of the con-
tract cannot be upheld; that the city council had 
the right to agree upon and fix temporary rates; 
... that the city council cannot delegate its duty 
to regulate, fix, and maintain reasonable rates, 
but that it must exercise this power and duty in 
that regard whenever the rates are or become 
excessive and unreasonable." 
'' \ Another Utah case in which the court has spoken 
t. 
1 clearly on the law with regards to the fixing and regu-
1e laiing of rates for city services is the case of City of 
in St. George v. Public Utilities Commission, 62 Ut. 453, 
ie , Z20 P. 720. In that case the city had a contract with the 
i!. 
1 
Power Company to provide free light service to the 
27 
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city. The Power Compa11y asked the Public Sen11 
Commission for a change in rates, which change 11, 
granted and the Public Service Commission took awa. 
free service to the city when it changed its rates, a1101: 
ing the city a credit of $9,907 .00. The court upheld tti, 
cancellation of free senice to the city, and in its rufa. 
made the following statement: 
"In this connection it is also well to remem~ 
that there are many decisions emanating from1t 
spectable courts of last resort in which it is hel. 
that the state can under no circumstances Sll! 
render its goyermncntal function of regulatin1; 
the rates for public utilities' service at any ani: 
all times to the end that rates shall be just an1 1 1 
fair to all, and that no one can be permitted 11: 
obtain an advantage whether for a short or fol 
a long period of time and whether contractua:I 
or otherwise." 
Again, we see by the law as expressed by this cour 
in the City of St. George case that it has been the ae 
clared policy of this State that the regulation of rali· 
for public utilities' service is a governmental functior 
which cannot be surrendered or suspended by a cil! 
council or a state regulating agency. The court further 
held that municipalities cannot enter into binding cDL 
tracts regarding rates for services rendered to the publir 
for the reason that the right to regulate and fix rate· 
cannot be surrendered in the absence of constitutiona' 
or statutory authority. The policy announced in botf, 
the Britmmitt case and City of St. George case has beeti 
in force in this State for many years and is still th 
law of the State of Utah. 
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Another interesting Utah case is that of F jeldsted 
v. Ogden City, 83 Ut. 278, 28 P.2d 144, in which our 
Supreme Court stated: 
"The power to fix reasonable rates for the 
commodity of service is in the board of commis-
sioners, and by the constitution it is under a duty 
to operate the system and supply water at rea-
sonable rates. Constitution, Art. 11, § 6. The 
board of comm,issioners may not by contract, 
restrict or curtail the powers of future boards to 
determine and to fix reasonable rates." (Em-
phasis added) . 
There are cases from other jurisdictions which have 
1: ruled on this matter the same as this Honorable Court. 
: In the case of West Caldwell v .Caldwell, 26 N . .J. 9, 
138 A.2d 402, the court stated: 
"A municipality cannot bind itself by per-
petual contract of unreasonable duration, unless 
by legislative sanction .... where, as here, the 
subject matter of the contract bears an legislative 
or governmental function of local subdivisions 
of government, involving the exerci.se of police 
power in the vital area of health and sanitation 
in fulfillment of the public need attendant on 
growth in population and new and different land 
uses and the expansion of old uses." 
A case from a sister state whose arid nature is 
similar to that of Utah, involving this problem, is that 
of Holt v. City of Cheyenne, 22 lVyo. 212, 137 P. 876, 
, wherein the plaintiff claimed title to water by adverse 
use for 24 years as against the City of Cheyenne. The 
court in that case says: 
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"VVe have 110 express statutory provision co1. 
ing or conferrmg the right to acquire titlt 
municip3:1 yr?perty uy, adverse user as aga~ 
~he mum.c1p~1ny, wh.ich propert¥ is held bJ 
w trust for its znlwbtiants, and in such case 
1 
riyht is denied by the yreat weiyht of authurir 
Citing authority applying the rule to lands 
streets. The court goes on to say: 
'·Such, we think, is the better reasoning, a· 
is ~upported by the great weight of author.· 
and to which many courts have in later cases, 
ceded, although a contrary doctrine had b~ 
announced in earlier decisions. The principle 
applicable in the case before us, for it may \Ii~ 
equal propriety be said that the city of Cheyenr1 
in the matter of acquiring and holding the ri:r1 
to the use of water for the benefit of the 1d1 [ 
public, acts as the agent of the state in exercisu~; 
within the provisions of its charter and the stat,I 
tory law, government.al functions and powe~\ 
and as already stated, the securing of water su1 
cient not alone for its present but such as n: 
be necessary for its future inhabitants was ar 
is within its governmental powers. Upon the fat 
alleged we 'are of the opinion that plaintitl 
theory of title by adverse user is untenablt 
(Emphasis added) . 
In the case of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water{' 
209 Cal. 105, 287 P. 47 5, the court says: 
"It may be stated as a general rule that~'.! 
invason of righ~s. of property ~vhich. are heh~~;I 
public or mumc1pal corporat10ns m perpe . 1 
trust for public uses can be held sufficient ··.I 
furnish the basis of defense based solely upi 
prescription. 
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"In the case of \T ernon Irrigation Co. v. Los 
Angeles, 106 Cal. 237, 39 P. 972, it was stated, 
with special reference to the rights to the waters 
of the Los Angeles river which the city had 
derived from the pueblo of Los Angeles, that the 
waters of all rivers were under the Spanish and 
Mexican rule, public property, for the use of 
the inhabitants. If this be true, it necessarily 
follows that the public right and public trust 
which the pueblo and its successor, the city of 
San Diego, had in these waters in no respect 
differed from those other public rights and prop-
erties which the state and its various subdivisions 
and agencies possess and administer; that it has 
been uniformly held that such public rights can-
not be lost nor the public trust as to their admin-
istration and ea:ercise be destroyed either by ad-
verse possession or by latches or by other negli-
gence on the part of the agents of the state or 
municipality who may from time to time be in-
vested with the duty of their protection and ad-
ministration. 
"The court found there were not facts upon 
which to base an estoppel in the usual case." 
"Even if it were conceded that a right based 
upon estoppel could arise by virtue of mere ac-
quiescence in its assertion as between private 
persons, we are satisfied that no such claim of 
right could come into being as against a muni-
cipal corporation, founded upon its mere acqui-
escence or that of its officials in the diversion by 
any number of upper appropriators or even of 
upper riparian owners of the waters of a stream 
to the use of which such public or municipal cor-
portion was entitled a.~ a portion of its public 
rights and properties held in perpetual trust for 
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public .use. The gene.ral rule upon this subjeei 3~ 
stated m 10 Cal. J ur1s., page 650, and cases cil R 
(Emphasis added) . t. 
In Reclamation District No. 833 v. Amerin 
Farms Co., 209 Cal. 74, 285 P. 688, the court heldlli 
an easement in a canal of a drainage district could 11, 
be acquired by adverse use as a private right may Ii 
be acquired in property of a public corporation derott 
to public use. 
In Patton v. City of TVilmington, 169 Cal. 5:1 
147 P. 141, the court says: 
"Possession under adverse claim of title 
land devoted to public use at the time, is wholi: 
ineffectual, not only upon the public use or ea11' 
ment, but also upon the title to the soil, or lanrJ: 
including the public easement and every suborrl1I 
nate estate, as well." \ 
The court quotes from Archer v. Salinas, 93 Ca: 1 
51, 28 P., at page 841: I 
"The p:operty de~icated has beco~e ~uliu I 
property, impressed with the use for wh1cl: it"'.' 
dedicated, and neither can the public divert 1' 
from that use, nor can it be lost by adverse P8' 
. " sessrnn. 
In Ames v. San Diego, 101 Cal. 394, 35 P. lOilol 
it is said that land held by a city in trust for a publii 
use " 'cannot be alienated by the city, and the title 
01 
· drer'P the public thereto cannot be lost by a possess10n a ·· 
to the city.' " 
I' 
. . C D 1 e 171 (:1. In Central Pacific Railway o. v. oa[J , 
32 
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32, 151 P. 663, the court refers to Northern Pacifiic 
Railway v. Towrnsend, 19 U.S. 267, 47 L.Ed. 1044, 
in which a grant of a 400 foot right of way had been 
granted by Congress to the railroad as follows : 
"In the last named case the court declared the 
rule to be that the estate granted in the strip 
designated as a right of way was an estate in fee 
for a special public purpose, subject only to re-
verter at the instance of the United States if the 
public use was not properly maintained, that the 
railroad company could not alienate any part of 
the right of way so as to interfere with the full 
exercise of the franchise granted. Referring to 
the claim of Townsend to a title by prescription, 
the court said: 
" 'It is evident that to give such efficacy to a 
statute of limitations of a state as would operate 
to confer a permanent right of possession to any 
portion thereof upon an individual for his private 
use would be to allow that to be done by indirec-
tion which could not be done directly, and that 
the possession by individuals of portion_s of the 
right of way cannot be treated, without over-
throwing the act of Congress, as forming the 
basis of an adverse possession which may ripen 
into a good title as against the railroad com-
pany.' " (Emphasis added). 
The court in the case of Placer Co. v. Lake Tahoe 
Railway & Tramportation Co., 58 Cal. App., 764, 209 
P. 90, held that no interest could be acquired by adverse 
'. P0ssession in a commons shown on a township plat as 
· a common for public use, saying: 
33 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. "It is well settled that where a piece of grouni. 
is reserved for or dedicated to public purposli' 
and therefore become~ public property, tilli 
thereto cannot be acqmred as against the puo[
11 
by adverse possessio11, and the right of action 11 
recover possession of tlle same for the public pur· 
poses to which it was dedicated is not subjec\!1, 
the statute of limitations, Board of Educatio~ 
of the City and County of San Francisco 1 1 
Martin, 92 Cal. 200, 28 P. 799." 
This court's attention is called to the case of 11Iar/i1! 
v. City of Stockton, 39 Cal. App. 721, 179 P. 8911 
This was a suit to quiet title to a parcel of land througl! 
which ran a waterway known as Miner's Channel 
used as a drain by the city under a conveyance to 1; 
which contained a provision that the grant was upon 
the express condition that the city use the premises ai 
a waterway and drain only. Plaintiff had occupiei 
part of the premises with a building and platform ana 
paint shop for 20 years and claimed title by adverst 
possession. The court says: I 
"It has been held and decided that no rignli 
can thus be acquired in and to the public proi· 
erty, or property devoted to a public use, 01 
owned by a municipality for public uses. Tn1 
mere fact that the municipal officers have been! 
either ignorant of, or indifferent to, the pub~' 
rights of a. municipality, does not enable. any tre·i.·, 
passer thereon to acquire any owne~sh1p tl:er~1~. 
or divest the city of one particle of its fee Ill,,,,. 
estate involved." 
The court further held that plaintiff could no'. I 
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adverse the reversionary interest of the grantor to the 
city. 
Another most interesting case which involved the 
claim of adverse use of city water as against the city 
is that of Rowland vs. Kellogg Power & Water Co., 
~3 Idaho 643, 253 P. 840. In answer to the claim of 
1 the water user that he by adverse use had acquired a 
right to use city water without paying therefor, the 
court stated: " ... that private ownership of water, 
devoted to the domestic use of the inhabitants of a 
city, may not be so acquired." In a concurring opinion 
one of the justices further stated: "Respondent refused 
to pay for the service, and urges that by reason of the 
fact that he has received this service gratuitiously for 
1 
many years he thereby acquired the right to the use 
of the water by adverse user." This contention is not 
tenable. A water right can neither be initiated nor 
acquired by adverse use from the distributing system 
I of a public service corporation. 1 Cal. J ur. 585. 
"Respondent claims no right in the system and 
' admits that title and ownership thereto rest in appel-
1 lant (City) . While he claims a water right, under the 
1 facts he has nothing more than a right to service, upon 
n\ compliance, in common with all other users, with the 
1 rules and regulations promulgated by the Public Utili-
~I ties Commission." 
:' '1 In view of the foregoing authorities and the law 
cited to the court, there should be no question whatso-
1'. \ erer that the abortive attempt of the city council of 
I 
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Salt Lake City on May 6, 1890, to "grant" for a: 
undefined period of time to the Territory free use 
11
: 
City water was null and void and could not be enforct.: 
at the time such agreement was entered into, nor couli. 
the fact that the City these many years last past h 
been serving its water to the State free of charge amouu 
to an estoppel which would in any way validate ur 
make enforceable such purported contract. 
The cases are legion which hold that a city ma.1. 
not lose property held in trust for the benefit of t~i; 
residents of such city by adverse use, nor can any sud[ 
city be estopped to deny the invalidity of any ultt:
1 
vires act of prior legislators where such act invo]n;l1 
a purely governmental function such as the control ol, 
water rates. There is no basis for a defense of lacl16' 
nor estoppel since the State cannot in any manner wlwl· 
soever show how it has changed its position with ref11 
ence to the use of water to its detriment in relia111i 
on the alleged contract of the city to furnish free waftr 
to the State in perpetuity. 
Regardless of all the authorities which hold a' 
stated above, there is the further logical argument tlini 
since cities in the State of Utah cannot alienate tberr 
water rights by any direct action, it would certainlyrur, 
contrary to the law if indirectly through adverse me. 
the application of estoppel or laches a city could ]oit' 
any of its water rights. 
The court's attention is called to the fact that 
111
: 1 
1890 agreement merely provided for the City to furnr)ii i 
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free use of water to the Territory. Nothing was said in 
the resolution of the City Council as to how long would 
be the duration of this arrangement. The 1926 agree-
ment specifically refers to the perpetual use of free 
water by the State and refers back to the 1890 agree-
ment. Whether or not it was the original intent of the 
City to supply water free of charge to the Territory 
in perpetuity it is certainly an ambiguous and uncertain 
aspect of the 1890 arrangement. The courts, in any 
event, do not favor contracts which by their terms are 
construed to be perpetual and particularly is this true 
with regards to a governmental function involving the 
exercise of police power such as the protection and 
preservation of the necessary water right held in trust 
for the benefit of the residents of that city. The case 
of West Caldwell v. Caldwell, supra, also deals with 
this question. The court in that case stated as follows: 
" ... perpetual and contractual performance 
is not favored in the law, and a construction af-
firming a right in perpetuity is to be avoided un-
less given in clear and peremptory terms." 
. It may be argued by the appellant that the State 
ia being superior to the City in its governmental status 
err . 
is not bound by the provisions of Article XI, Section 
'Ul 
· 6 of the Utah Constitution. In this regard, the court's 
1se. 
attention is called to the case of State of New Mexico 
Qlt' 
t'. City of Aztec, 77 N.M. 524, 424 P.2d 801 (March 
6, 1967). This case involved a question as to whether 
t\1': ·:r not a constitutional provision, limiting the power 
rri~·,, \ of a city to contract a debt, applied to a city's indebted-
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ness to a state agency. 'l'hc court held that the co
11
.,, 
tutional provision did apply to the state and its agtii 
and the contract was held to be invalid whereunri 
the city had agreed to pay a share of the cost of a shrr: 
sewer in connection with a highway project. Tnr 
appears to be no logic u:hich would justify exclud!: 
this State from the effect of its own constitutioii 
provisions and it would, therefore, follow afortiori 1i 
any contract entered into lJy this State which viola! 
an express provision of its own constitution is null a:..r 
void. 
CONCLUSION i 
I 
In view of the foregoing authorities cited to t1t: 
court (and many others of which the court is more ful[ 
aware than counsel) which support the respon<lenl. 
position, it is respectfully submitted that the li'.1 
arrangement for the City to provide free use of tic 
water to the Territory and that the 1926 agreemer 
for the City to provide the free use of additional cir 
water in perpetuity to the State are both null and rn:. 
and of no legal effect for the reasons set forth herein aL 
that the lower court did not err in granting sm111H:ir 
judgment for the respondent, which judgment tfi 
honorable court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOMER HOLl\IGRE>' ! 
City Attorney 
LEON A. HALGRE~ 
Assistant City Attorney 
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